SOF就是特事特办的工具浦京在线,任何形式转载请联系作者

Special Operation Forces – Department of Defense 1984 – PIN
701181 -The film tells the story of the Special Operations Forces, and
the special situ

摘要:
美利坚联邦合众国古板基金会近期恰恰发文提出美利坚同盟国办起“北极司令部”争夺北极财富,方今再创作供给美利坚协作国“压实战备”,增美智库建议美军抓实战备并出示实力
以胁迫中国和俄罗丝美利坚联邦合众国古板基金会新近正巧发文提出米利坚开办“北极司令部”争夺北极能源,方今再次创下作须求美利坚同盟友“加强战备”,加强军事影响工夫,以求达到遏制中俄在亚太的影响等指标。
美利哥陆军拳拍掌号黄蜂级两栖攻击舰
该文题为《临近“看不见的红线”:为啥国会必得选拔行动苏醒战备》,仅从难题上便可获悉其主题在于挑唆美利坚同车笠之盟提升军备。该文说,U.S.在经过了两年的角落战役和国内防守行动之后,包括U.S.国民警卫队和后备军在内的保有军种的战备水平都在减低,其表现为三种式的磨练项目延迟了、减弱了、减弱了,区别部门间人士和配备的跨级计划严重非常不足,陈旧武器贫乏维护,海外派兵前的休整时间大大收缩。固然国会拨付了一部分军方急需的本金,但要恢复生机美军的即时反应本事还会有众多专业要做。针对这种情景,该文拟出了多条建议,包括提出对美军的武备进行当下保证,并张开今世化;恢复生机军训,增添实弹练习,缩小对模拟练习的正视性;持续增加武警数量;将海军和海军的备忘录协议制度化,抓好两军在各方面包车型地铁沟通和帮衬;补充美军前沿地带的储备及战术储备等。小说还特意涉及与外国武装张开协同军事练习对增加美军应战反应手艺的主要性成效。作品称,与别国军事开展的大大小小的军事练习可以使得地出示美军的军事实力,对秘密的“侵犯者”构成威慑。极度是在不断对海上和空中军开表当代化的中国和俄国所在的亚太地区,此类军事练习显得愈加关键。古板基金会被视为美利哥亲保守派的要紧智囊组织,创设于1973年,分公司设于美利坚合营国都城Washington哥伦比亚(República de Colombia)特区。该组织代表美国东西边财团极端保守势力的利润,主张U.S.A.应有庞大的国防力量,曾反复撰文建议美利坚合营国遏制中华夏族民共和国。下页:土耳其共和国(Türkiye Cumhuriyeti)语最早的作品Approaching
the “Invisible Red Line”: Why Congress Must Act Now to Restore Military
Readinessby Mackenzie EaglenAll the military services, including the
National Guard and Reserves, are experiencing lower levels of readiness
after seven years of major combat operations overseas and more homeland
defense missions in the United States. Symptoms include delayed,
shortened, or less diverse training; cross-leveling of personnel and
equipment from disparate units to plug deploy­ing-unit shortfalls; less
maintenance for worn-out weapons; and shortened rest time at home before
redeploying overseas. While Congress has provided much-needed funding
for many urgent needs of the services, more must be done to restore
immediate readiness within the 美利坚同盟军 military (without sacrificing
long-term readiness).Short-Term Readiness in JeopardyGeneral 吉优rge
Casey, Chief of Staff of the U.S.A. Army, warned the Senate Armed Services
Committee in February: While the Army remains the best led, best
trained, and best equipped Army in the world, it is out of balance. The
combined effects of an operational tempo that provides insufficient
recovery time for personnel, families, and equipment—a focus on training
for counter­insurgency operations to the exclusion of other
capabilities, and Reserve Component assigned missions for which they
were not originally intended nor adequately resourced—result in our
readiness being consumed as fast as we can build it. [1] All Army
combat brigades currently in the United States or preparing to deploy
are rated as not ready. The readiness of ground forces is roughly
measured by four factors: personnel, training, available equip­ment, and
critical enablers for joint operations, such as actionable intelligence,
global communica­tions, and space superiority.[2] Short-term readiness
is typically evaluated through unit ratings, recruitment and retention
goals met, full-time manning in the Reserves, and operations tempo.
Long-term readiness may be analyzed by reviewing current military
construction projects, assessing the health of installation facilities,
recapi­talization of equipment, modernization of major weapons systems,
and research and development of next-generation technology. Short-term
readiness is dangerously low in the U.S. Army and has been for several
years, thereby jeopardizing long-term readi­ness, as well.Similar to the
case of the Army, the U.S. Marine Corps’ successful operations abroad
have also led to decreased unit readiness here in the United States. In
February, Marine Corps Commandant General James Conway testified that
one consequence of successful operations overseas is an “increase in the
maintenance required per hour of operating time.” He continued, stating:
Equipment across the Marine Corps is con­tinuously cross-leveled to
ensure that units preparing to deploy have sufficient equip­ment to
conduct our rigorous pre-deploy­ment training programs. Because the
stateside priority of equipment distribution and readiness is to units
preparing to deploy, there has been a trade-off in unit training for
other types of contingencies. The timely delivery of replacement
equipment is crucial to sustaining the high readiness rates for the
Marines in theater, as well as improving the rates for the forces here
at home. While addi­tional equipment has been purchased, long lead times
and production rates mean that, although funded, much of this equipment
is still many months from delivery.[3] While Congress has been
sympathetic to the reset needs by providing funding to the military, it
is not enough. According to General Conway, “Reset funding has partially
alleviated this strain, but con­tinued funding is needed as we are
simply running short of aircraft on our flight lines due to age,
attri­tion, and wartime losses.”[4] He testified that while reset
programs have helped mitigate degradation of aircraft materiel readiness
through aircraft modifica­tions, proactive inspections, and additional
mainte­nance actions, additional requirements for depot level
maintenance on airframes, engines, weapons, and support equipment will
continue well beyond the conclusion of hostilities.[5] Policies that
allow cross-leveling of equipment and personnel have a negative effect
on the active component as well as the National Guard and
Reserves—entities that are on the mend after years of reduced readiness
and over-use in order to meet deployment needs. The demands of
warfighting missions, particularly in Iraq, have badly depleted the Army
National Guard’s domestic store of vehi­cles, weapons, and
communications gear.On average, states have only 40 percent of their
Guard equipment on hand to respond to crises, such as hurricanes,
floods, and wildfires.[6] Congress has provided billions in funding
specifically for Reserve Component equipment over the past sev­eral
years. The next step in restoring readiness and easing current strains
will be to further grow the endstrength of the National Guard and
Reserves.Today, no service is immune to readiness chal­lenges—including
the Navy and Air Force—since all the services fight and win together in
joint oper­ations. Barely half of all Air Force units were fully
mission-capable in March 2007.[7] The U.S. Navy recently discovered
that two surface combatant warships were unfit for combat, and senior
Navy leaders called for a “strategic pause” to comprehen­sively
reevaluate and take stock of the current fleet of surface ships.[8]
Vice Admiral D.C. Curtis, commander of Naval Surface Forces, wrote in a
memo to sailors: “Recent formal and informal assessments and inspections
indicate that our self-assessment capability has declined, resulting in
reduced readiness. We made a lot of changes in the surface force in the
past few years…. We must conduct a rigorous assessment of the impact
on readiness of these changes so we can make appropriate course
corrections.”[9] Press reports indicate a review is underway by senior
Navy leaders to determine whether sailors received enough hands-on
training “as fiscal realities drove [the Navy’s surface force] to
place more reliance on computer-based training. We are looking at this
from an enterprise perspective to see if we have reduced en route
training too much.”[10] Ancillary Training CreepA significant
component to maintaining readi­ness is training. Training does not just
include pre­paring forces about to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan in
counterinsurgency operations, but also conven­tional warfare training in
non-desert terrains, for example. Military service members receiving
train­ing do not have the luxury of preparing for or focus­ing on only
one type of conflict. They must be trained on all weapons systems and
platforms for all types of contingencies—even while major combat
operations are going on elsewhere.Senior military commanders in Iraq
have noted that soldiers and Marines currently “lack training for major
combat operations using their entire range of weapons…. For example,
artillerymen are not practicing firing heavy guns but are instead doing
counterinsurgency work as military police.”[11] General Robert Magnus,
Assistant Com­mandant of the Marine Corps, has noted the Marine Corps’
ability to train for potential conflicts has been “significantly
degraded.”[12] While some stress was relieved after the Marine units
provided for the “surge” in Iraq completed their missions, “new demands
in Afghanistan, where 3,200 Marines are headed and more are likely to
follow, have kept the pressure on the force unchanged.”[13] Former
Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General T. Michael Moseley, was
concerned that airmen—par­ticularly those in the Guard and Reserves—are
spending too much time training outside their mis­sion specialties. In
one of his “Chief’s Notes” to all airmen, he described this phenomenon
as “ancillary training creep” that jeopardizes mission accom­plishment
with the potential to overshadow combat focus.[14] Maximizing the use
of airmen’s time was of primary concern to General Moseley.Beyond
potentially misspent time, there are secondary and tertiary effects of
reduced training in a service member’s core competency. These negative
possibilities may include an altered career path where professional
military education, specialty certifications, or other development and
education suffers thereby affecting the perfor­mance reviews that, in
part, help determine pro­motion and pay increases.National Consequences:
Higher Risk, Less Strategic FlexibilityThe potential consequences of
reduced readiness levels across the U.S. military range from the
practi­cal—such as more time in depot for maintenance on equipment used
at five or six times the peace­time rate and more mechanics required to
keep older planes, ships, and vehicles running—to the dire, such as an
unforeseen crisis requiring aid from the U.S. military. Restoring
readiness is absolutely critical because the nation does not have the
resid­ual capacity in many units, particularly the Army, to respond to
domestic emergencies should they arise.In addition to a reduced ability
to respond quickly to crises here in the United States, there are many
second-tier effects of low readiness levels in the military. Regional
combatant commanders beyond Central Command—which includes Iraq and
Afghanistan in its area of responsibility—have seen their personnel and
equipment diverted to these two countries over the past several years.
Admiral Timothy Keating, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, recently
noted that current mis­sion demands have hindered his ability to respond
to an unforeseen crisis in the military’s largest geo­graphical command
region because 30,000 ground forces that are typically under his control
are in the Middle East instead.[15] Strategic engagement has also
suffered as exer­cises with foreign militaries and alliances have been
curtailed over the last several years. These demands have also hamstrung
Pacific Command’s “ability to conduct exercises and forge alliances with
foreign nations that could one day prove instrumental,” particularly in
building relationships to reduce the potential for future
conflict.[16] Large and small exercises with foreign militaries
provide an effective display of capabilities—acting as a deterrent to
would-be aggressors—and are important methods for enhancing military
readi­ness. An effort to increase these exercises would be especially
useful in the Asia–Pacific—where China and Russia continue to modernize
their naval and air capabilities—and in places like the Horn of Africa
and the Strait of Hormuz, where increased coordination is required to
stem the threat posed by both pirates and terrorists.Similarly, since
9/11 the U.S. has worked dili­gently to train and equip foreign
militaries in coun­terterrorism as well as other security and stability
operations. The U.S. military participates in the Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership, the Regional Strategic Initiative, the DOD
Counterter­rorism Fellowship Program, and the Building Glo­bal
Partnerships Train and Equip program carried out under section 1206
authority, under which DOD may spend appropriated funds to train and
equip foreign militaries to undertake counterterror­ism or stability
operations.[17] Both U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command
have made building partnerships and enhancing strategic cooperation
central pillars of their missions. In addition to the benefits offered
by training foreign militaries, these initiatives also serve to
strengthen respect for the civil–military relation­ship and should not
be bill payers for readiness.Special Operations Forces (SOF) are not
immune to the vast demands in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cur­rently, more
than 80 percent of America’s SOF are deployed in one region: Central
Command.[18] These elite forces have been deployed at this
unsustainable rate since 2001, and as a result are under-repre­sented in
other critical theaters of the world— including Latin America—and unable
to respond to competing mission priorities elsewhere.According to
Admiral Michael Mullen, Chair­man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because
of the demand for SOF by Central Command leaders, “there’s a lot of
Special Forces work that they’ve been doing for years in other parts of
the world that just isn’t getting done [now]…. That builds risk over
time, and we have to assess that.”[19] This prob­lem was also
highlighted in the Department of Defense 2006 Quadrennial Defense
Review.In response, U.S. Special Operations Command is growing to a
force of 55,890 civilian and military personnel, including five
additional special forces battalions, four additional Ranger companies,
300 new Navy SEALs, 2,500 Marine Special Operations Forces, and
additional special operations aviators by the end of fiscal year
2009.[20] SOF growth is essential, but additional forces alone will
not fully restore readiness levels until units and capabilities are
spread more evenly among the military’s regional areas of
responsibility.Further consequences of continued low readi­ness levels
include recruitment and retention dif­ficulties and the overall decline
in the condition of the nation’s all-volunteer force. While all the
ser­vices have done tremendous work in meeting high recruiting and
retention goals since 2001, there are palpable signs of strain.The U.S.
Army is currently experiencing a shortfall in mid-career officers that
poses long-term risks to the service. In 2007, the U.S. Army was “short
about 3,000 mid-career officers…. As a result, the Army is promoting
captains and majors at rates well above its own guidelines and, in the
process, is probably retaining more underachieving officers.”[21]
Admiral Mullen care­fully tracks what he calls lagging indicators,
including promotion rates, noting that the Army is “promoting captains
and majors at eight years on average rather than at nine or 10 years, as
in the recent past.”[22] Restoring Readiness Levels in the U.S.
MilitaryA trained, rested, and prepared force is the linch­pin of the
nation’s core capacity to respond to future threats—sometimes on only a
moment’s notice. Congress has been responsive in providing signifi­cant
funding for restoring readiness levels in the military over the past
several years as the stress on the force has become more acute.Congress
must not ignore the ongoing pleas from military and defense officials,
however, for sustained defense spending (at today’s levels) for at least
three years after major combat operations in Iraq subside in order to
reset the force and modern­ize at the same time. Defense Secretary
Robert Gates recently reflected this opinion in a speech at National
Defense University, where he warned of the “important lessons learned”
from deep cuts to the defense budget following the Cold War.[23] While
readiness is low, particularly in the Army, there are direct steps
Congress can and should take to provide immediate relief and help
restore short- and long-term military readiness, including: 1.
Maintenance, maintenance, maintenance. Timely maintenance on all the
military’s major platforms is mandatory to maintain or extend the
service lives of equipment being used at wartime rates. Proper planning
and prioritization of maintenance also allows the services to reduce
lifecycle costs while supplying equipment back into the hands of
warfighters more quickly. 2. Reset old equipment and modernize. A
signifi­cant element of restoring readiness levels includes the
procurement of new platforms and resetting older, worn-out items. The
Govern­ment Accountability Office estimates that the cost for the Army
to equip modular units, expand the force by 74,000 personnel, reset
equipment, and replace pre-positioned equip­ment will cost $190 billion
between 2004 and 2013.[24] This funding cannot be cannibalized within
the defense budget, but should instead come in the form of a topline
increase. 3. Avoid training creep. The 2008 Army Posture Statement
accepts that the “current operational requirements for forces and
insufficient time between deployments require a focus on
coun­terinsurgency training and equipping to the det­riment of
preparedness for the full range of military missions.”[25] As Iraq
continues to stabi­lize and U.S. force levels there decline, U.S. ground
forces must resume training for both irregular and conventional missions
(amphibi­ous assault, combined-arms, etc.) using their entire range of
weapons. 4. Increase live-fire training and reduce reliance on
simulation when necessary. Congress should direct the services to review
the percent­age of forces trained by simulation compared to live-fire
training to determine if it is indeed the right mix for today’s mission
requirements. As Lt. Col. James Rice, operations officer at Fort Carson
in Colorado, astutely observed, “We maximize use of simulators and
simulations, but that only goes so far. You need training that puts
realistic combat stress on soldiers, stress on their vehicles and stress
on their communications systems (so they can) live with and deal with
the friction you encounter on the battlefield.”[26] 5. Reinvigorate
multi-national exercises and for­eign military engagements. Long-term
stability and security is served by building military part­nerships and
preserving coalitions by training and advising foreign military forces.
Larger mili­tary engagements, such as the biannual Rim of the Pacific
exercise, and smaller bilateral training opportunities that target
specific operational issues serve to increase interoperability between
the United States and its friends and allies. These important exercises
and engagements should be restored or increased overseas based on
combat­ant commander assessments. 6. Continue to grow Special Operations
Forces at a rate that will maintain overall quality. Congress must
carefully monitor the growth of these highly skilled and professional
forces to ensure that quality is not sacrificed for the sake of
expediency. Congress should understand that this growth, while helping
to address shortfalls, must also be designed to retain the quality of
SOF by remaining consistent with the U.S. Spe­cial Operations Command’s
“SOF Truths.” These include: humans are more important than hard­ware;
quality is better than quantity; Special Operations Forces cannot be
mass-produced; and competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created
after emergencies occur.”[27] 7. Reduce reliance on Navy and Air Force
per­sonnel for ground missions overseas. The use of non-U.S. Army
personnel serving “in lieu of” soldiers overseas has grown in the past
several years. For instance, between June 2007 and June 2008, the number
of U.S. forces in Afghanistan increased from 26,480 to 48,250. This
increase of 21,770 forces included a total of 13,416 Air Force and Navy
active and reserve personnel— representing 62 percent of the total
increase in force levels.[28] This may prove to be unhealthy for the
Navy and Air Force given the potential long-term damage to individual
sailor and air­man promotion rates and military career special­ties.
Congress should exercise stringent oversight of this practice to ensure
that no good deeds are being inadvertantly punished. 8. Institutionalize
the Joint Army–Air Force Memorandum of Agreement. A recent memo­randum
signed by Army and Air Force officials outlined each service’s
commitment to providing direct support liaisons at multiple levels of
com­mand in order to identify opportunities for joint development of
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures through the exchange of
person­nel between service schools. Congress should conduct adequate
oversight to ensure this effort is being implemented on an operational
level and provide the necessary resources for success. 9. Re-stock
America’s pre-positioned programs and strategic stockpiles. A mandatory
hedge against future contingencies resides in fully stocked weapons
reserves. The U.S. Army should have five full combat brigades’ worth of
weapons available: two stocks in Kuwait, one in South Korea, and two
aboard ships in Guam and at the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean.
But the afloat stocks were emptied last year to supply larger numbers of
troops in Iraq as part of a surge, and the Kuwait stocks are being
rotated in and out of the country.[29] Only the South Korea
pre-positioned stock is close to complete. Congress should provide
immediate funding so that all may be restored fully as soon as
possible.ConclusionIt may come as a surprise to many people, both in
Congress and the general public, to learn that even with the military
budget increases of recent years, the U.S. military is essentially
living pay­check-to-paycheck. As Admiral Gary Roughhead, Chief of Naval
Operations, testified before Congress in February, “The execution of our
current readiness and force structure plans faces many challenges, but
affordability is the most pressing. I refuse to cede our technological
advantage to competitors; how­ever current readiness, manpower, and
escalating procurement costs make pacing the threat excep­tionally
difficult.”[30] Congress must prevent the U.S. military from crossing
any “invisible red line” of dangerously reduced readiness that would
likely be detected only after the fact.[31] In order to prevent this
type of perilous situation from occurring, Congress must provide a
sustained commitment of resources and funding long after victory in Iraq
and Afghanistan. It is crucial that Congress and the next
Administra­tion commit now to providing defense funding at current
levels of roughly 4 percent of gross domestic product for the next
several years in order to repair and replace worn-out equipment,
modernize the force, and restore military readiness. The security of the
country depends on it.Mackenzie M. Eaglen is Senior Policy Analyst for
National Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, a division of the Kath­ryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

AWS CQB Vest CarrierCQB Vest Carrier is the latest version of the famous
Trauma vest carrier. It accepts SPEAR body armor inserts and SAPI
plates. The system in

19~27号组作业

This is a story about an American hero. For decades, Hollywood has been
reproducing the formula that “One hero that saves the world”. The
amplitude of Marvel movies and franchised hero products feeds the
country’s hunger for individual heros. Individualism, at its core, is
what the nation always strives or claims to strive for. Thus, I admire
Hacksaw Ridge for it is able to tell a story about a true American hero
without completely following the conventional traps or cliches of the
heroic story. Though some might argue that this is still a Hollywood
movie, I think it has its own unique ways of retelling and rebranding
the story so that the audience would find it new and illuminating.
 

Special Operation Forces – Department of Defense 1984 – PIN 701181 –

AWS CQB Vest Carrier

新闻链接:

浦京在线 1

The film tells the story of the Special Operations Forces, and the
special situations, for unconventional war, and a general war if the
need arises because of today’s world situations. The evolving nations
with political and economic power struggles have created a constant
stream of world wide special situations and these are the missions of
SOF.

CQB Vest Carrier is the latest version of the famous Trauma vest
carrier. It accepts SPEAR body armor inserts and SAPI plates. The system
includes many modular accessories: magazine pouches, radio pouch,
shoulder / groin protector, chest holster, multi-purpose back panel,
MOLLE back panel, and etc. It is currently used by Army and Air force
special forces.

作业标题:If you choose a movie to see which one you will choose. Why?

As taught in my screenwriting class, a great film always outlines a
hero’s journey. They have something that they’re passionate about, and
one day, when it has been taken away by unforeseeable forces, the hero
embarks on the journey to reclaim his love. While on the road, he always
make unhealthy choices and thus we have the movie been made. After
reexamining this formula, I think I’m secretly laughing at my own
naivety, for Hacksaw Ridge almost matches all the key elements of the
hero’s journey. Thus, I think it is important to examine the hero of the
story, and what makes him different. The first is of course, he is real.
This kind of remind me of the movie “sully”. While Sully is an American
hero that saves the lives of 200 passengers, Desmond saves the lives of
75 fellow soldiers. Except for Desmond, the battlefield is much more
fierce and complicated. While Sully fights against weather, the
committee and his conscientious, Desmond fights against the enemy,
human’s physical limitation, other’s disbelief in his faith and his
belief in his faith.
 

多个国家互相政经角逐下阪上走丸的国际形势产生了不菲特定条件下的一定情景,SOF便是特事特办的工具。

浦京在线 2

李和寅作业:If I choose a movie to see,I will choose Operation Red Sea
of ten movies from China daily.

浦京在线 3

  1. Foreign internal defense 他国内部防范

  2. Unconventional warfare 特别规战役

  3. Strategic and tactical reconnisance 战术战略调查

  4. Strike袭击

  5. Strategic and tactical PSYOPS 战略战术激情战行动

  6. Civil administration 民事行政

  7. Rescue and evacuation 救援和撤离

  8. Collection security 集体安全

  9. Humanitarian operations 人道主义职分

  10. Terrorism counteraction 反恐职责

  11. Civil affairs 民事义务

  12. Safeguarding of 美利坚合众国 citizens abroad 拥戴国外赤子

  13. Deception operations 佯动

  14. Security assistance 军援

  15. Special Operations Aviation 特种飞行

  16. Sabotage 破坏活动

浦京在线 4

There are two reasons explaining that.the  first one,Operation Red sea
is the box office sales champion for the Spring Festival of 2018,and
the box office represents the quality of the film to a certain
extent,so this is the first reason why I want to see that.

It almost seems as if the whole world is against him and one man has to
fight against the world for his true belief. In fact, it is Desmond’s
faith that sets him as the outlier and as the unwelcome, despite his
willingness to contribute to the welfare of his country, let alone to
die for his country. Thus, despite the harsh treatment by his fellow
soldiers, he insists on doing what he believes and what he thinks is
right. And he survives in the unimaginary situations and become everyone
else’s savior. Ironically, he becomes the savior to those who has
bitterly belittled him in the first place. But when it comes to the
matter of life and death, difference in faith has to be set aside.

浦京在线 5

The second is Operation Red sea tells the story of the Chinese army
defending the country and defending the Chinese people.I’m very
interested in this type of movie.So this is the second reason why I 
want to see this movie.(得分9.5分)

浦京在线 6

PBPV II Body Armor

董远龙作业:If I choose a movie to see,I will choose Operation Red Sea.

 If I continue to write following the previous observations, I think my
review would fall into the trap of merely recounting the story without
analyzing the complexity of the characters. And I think the film did an
amazing job of explaining Desmond’s upbringing and how he end up being
the man that he is on the battlefield. Many people think his belief in
not holding the gun stems from fear, instead, it stems from the deep
love the man have for life. Growing up, he learnt two bitter lessons
about what rage can do to a person. One from his childhood pastime
activities with his brother. The other from the violent exchange between
him and his father. At the same time, the film also did a great job of
making his father human, so that we understand what he has been through
and would not blame him for what he has done to his son.

Army SF Desert camo PBPV II body armor, with two M16 Magazine pouches
at each side.

  For behind the scenes,The script of the film was adapted from the
“Yemen evacuation” incident that occurred on March 29, 2015. The total
production cost will reach 500 million yuan; the military equipment
budget will reach 200 million yuan. The film uses the “sea, land and air
three-wire scheduling” and “real shooting” shooting format. Taking
pictures in Africa and Morocco, from the steep mountains to deserted
deserts, from the bustling city streets to the deserted ancient city
lanes, nearly 10 districts have been turned around.

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